The stadium subsidy debate is over and economists have moved on

The problem is that economists have been testing that promise for decades, and the results have not been kind to the pitch. In a forthcoming Economic Development Quarterly reply, John Charles Bradbury and Brad Humphreys put it plainly: “it is accurate to describe the academic consensus as generally opposed to public underwriting of professional sports venues.”

That sentence matters for policymakers because stadium deals often proceed as if the research is unsettled. Bradbury and Humphreys are responding to a commentary by Johnson, Fort, and Rosentraub (2025) arguing that the “consensus” framing is overstated and that governments should weigh costs and benefits project by project. Bradbury and Humphreys’ response is direct: “their recommendation that proposed venue projects need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis is not backed by available evidence.”

One reason this debate keeps looping is that proponents lean on two ideas that sound reasonable in isolation. First, even if stadiums do not boost “regional economic activity” much, they might create civic pride and quality-of-life benefits. Second, even if many past projects disappointed, the next one could be different.

The paper tackles both.

Start with the consensus question. Bradbury and Humphreys note two prominent surveys of economists showing overwhelming skepticism. In a 2005 survey of American Economic Association members, 85% agreed that state and local governments should eliminate subsidies to professional sports franchises. A 2017 University of Chicago economics panel survey found 80% agreement that stadium subsidies are likely to cost taxpayers more than the local economic benefits generated. The commentary they rebut questions sample size and wording. Bradbury and Humphreys argue those critiques do not land, noting the caliber of the respondents and the lack of a clear mechanism for systematic bias.

Next, the “intangibles” argument. Policymakers hear it constantly: even if the economic impact is small, residents value having a major league team and a signature venue. Bradbury and Humphreys’ key point is not that intangible benefits are zero. It is that they are typically far smaller than the public price tag. Their summary line is hard to misread: “academic studies indicate that the sum of tangible and intangible benefits are typically too small to justify government underwriting of professional sports stadium projects.”

That framing helps policymakers avoid a common rhetorical trap. A stadium can produce real amenities and still be a poor public investment at the scale of modern subsidies. Bradbury and Humphreys also emphasize that spillovers are not uniform across communities and that some research finds negative externalities like crime, congestion, and other disamenities that can offset the positives.

Then comes the “just study it harder” move. In principle, careful benefit-cost analysis is a good habit. In practice, stadium debates rely on forward-looking projections commissioned by interested parties, built on discretionary assumptions. Bradbury and Humphreys warn against treating those forecasts as neutral evidence, writing: “The track record of forward-looking benefit-cost/fiscal impact analyses that accompany nearly all stadium projects has been one of consistent failure.”

This is where the national lesson becomes practical. Cities are often told to negotiate a better deal, demand more community benefits, or commission another consultant report. Those steps can improve transparency. They do not change the base rate: stadium subsidies rarely generate net public returns.

Bradbury and Humphreys close by putting the burden where it belongs. If a public subsidy is being proposed, the default assumption should not be that it “might work this time.” It should be that it probably will not, unless proven otherwise. As they write, “The state of current research findings is so united in opposition that the burden of proof rests squarely on subsidy proponents to provide robust evidence using established economic research methods to demonstrate the feasibility of any public stadium proposal.”

None of this requires hostility toward sports. It requires candor about what public dollars are buying. If a city wants a stadium as a consumption amenity, officials can say so and let voters judge the tradeoff. What cities should stop doing is calling stadium subsidies “economic development” when the research record says otherwise.