Leaders knew the Amazon HQ2 contest was rigged. They played anyway.

Richard Florida’s new paper explains why cities keep bidding for subsidies they know are wasteful, and it points toward a way out.

There is a paradox at work in many economic development subsidies: local officials offer corporate incentives even when they know the effort is wasteful. If their city refuses to play along, they fear, another city may take the jobs, the teams or the tax revenue. After all, you can’t win if you don’t play.

Consider the rush to woo Amazon for its second headquarters in 2017. Leaders may have identified the scam, yet the competition generated 238 proposals from cities and regions pursuing tens of thousands of jobs. This is the topic of urban theorist Richard Florida’s new paper, “The Paradox of Economic Development,” published in Economic Development Quarterly.

In it, Florida details those heady days when cities across North America were falling over themselves to bid for Amazon’s HQ2 and the 50,000 jobs and $5 billion in investment that would come with it. He tells of resigning his position on the board of Toronto Global, the organization leading the city’s bid to win Amazon’s second headquarters in 2017, because he opposed the effort and wanted to “do so freely without compromising my city.”

Florida writes that on September 17 of that year, while delivering the keynote address to the International Economic Development Council’s annual conference, held in Toronto for the first time, he told the audience the competition looked like “the biggest ruse”—an effort by Amazon to play cities against one another when the company probably already knew where it wanted to locate. Development officials, he says, privately told him they shared his suspicions.

Not all have been quiet about such competitions. Sean O’Byrne, a Kansas City development leader, told The New York Times in 2012 of incentive wars, “It sounds like I’m talking myself out of a job, but there ought to be a law against what I’m doing.” Florida is not the first to understand that these subsidy wars are a scam. Indeed it took him a long time to get to where many others already stood. But it’s a welcome admission from someone whose “creative class” theory once helped shape how cities used tax incentives to compete for companies, workers and investment.

This was not the first time Florida had changed his mind. And while it is good to adjust one’s view to new information, as journalist Alec MacGillis pointed out, cities that took Florida’s earlier advice seriously can’t easily undo the spending it inspired.

In The Rise of the Creative Class (2002), Florida argued that cities should chase not just companies but the “technology, talent and tolerance” that draw creative workers—a formula that pushed cities to subsidize the coffee shops, galleries and walkable blocks those workers supposedly wanted. Critics doubted it almost immediately. Steven Malanga found in 2004 that several of Florida’s model creative-class cities underperformed less trendy rivals on jobs and population growth, and economic geographer Jamie Peck dismissed the strategy a year later as “biscotti and circuses.” A 2009 study of 276 metro areas found no relationship between Florida’s creative-class measure and economic growth, while ordinary human capital did predict it.

The core problem with so many attempts to engineer urban growth comes down to confusing cause and effect. Educated workers, restaurants, cultural amenities and attractive neighborhoods are plainly desirable. Their presence signals prosperous cities, but that does not mean one can manufacture prosperity by subsidizing them. My colleagues and I called Kansas City’s version of this approach “Baristanomics” in 2015: subsidize the places where young professionals drink coffee and socialize, and growth is supposed to follow. It doesn’t.

But Florida’s thinking was already changing. By 2009, he was arguing that policymakers should accept an uncomfortable reality: some struggling places might not recover. “Ultimately, we can’t stop the decline of some places,” he wrote in The Atlantic, “we would be foolish to try.”

By 2016, Florida acknowledged he was wrong to believe the creative class could “magically restore our cities” and become a new middle class. His 2017 book, The New Urban Crisis, focused instead on gentrification, inequality and exclusion in many of the successful cities he had previously celebrated. That evolution brought another round of criticism. Writing in Belt Magazine in 2017, Frank Bures questioned whether Florida had repositioned himself so that he could claim credit both for anticipating the creative class urban revival and for diagnosing its harmful consequences.

But on September 14, 2017—three days before Florida called the HQ2 competition a ruse—the Kansas City Business Journal reported that Florida had agreed to advise the Kansas City Area Development Council on its HQ2 proposal. And when KCADC submitted the completed bid on October 19, it publicly credited Florida and Joel Kotkin with providing “significant research support and guidance.”

Contemporary reporting also suggests his Toronto involvement may have been more direct than the new paper conveys. In January 2018, Philadelphia Magazine reported that Florida had “served on the panel that put together” Toronto’s bid, which made Amazon’s list of 20 finalists.

When Florida warned HQ2 finalists against offering Amazon billions of dollars in subsidies, I agreed: “Florida is right,” I wrote at the time. But I also asked whether he had given Kansas City the same warning while helping prepare its proposal. KCADC never released its HQ2 bid. But when Kansas City failed to make the 20 finalists, City Manager Troy Schulte said its bid’s incentives were likely not big enough.

Florida seems to have been caught in the paradox he now decries, participating in the very competition he argued cities should resist. His 2026 paper would have been much stronger had he acknowledged his own susceptibility to it.

Florida may have urged Kansas City to compete on genuine strengths rather than subsidies. Perhaps he grew increasingly troubled as the competition unfolded and decided he could no longer participate. We don’t know, as his paper does not mention his work for Kansas City at all. That omission matters because either explanation would strengthen Florida’s argument. If he warned against subsidies and the city proceeded anyway, that demonstrates the power of the paradox. If he concluded Amazon was manipulating cities and remained involved, it shows the paradox caught him too.

Notably, some city leaders did resist the temptation to go along. San Antonio Mayor Ron Nirenberg declined to submit a formal bid, arguing that while the city welcomed the investment, he was “not going to mortgage our future to do it.” Toronto submitted a proposal, but it included no financial incentives. Florida said at the time, “If everyone would’ve behaved like Toronto and Ontario, this would’ve been a much better process.”

Florida is right that cities can recognize the economic development game is wasteful and yet still believe they must play. But that is not a new observation, and neither is his proposed solution. In 2017, Michael Farren and Matthew Mitchell proposed an interstate compact specifically intended to end what they called the economic-development subsidy “arms race.” Shortly thereafter, Florida launched his own change.org campaign to end the practice. Florida’s more recent version is broader, but the basic insight is the same: jurisdictions cannot easily disarm individually, so they should agree to disarm together.

The difficulty cities face is real. Even when leaders know the competition is ruinous, they feel compelled to go along, fearing that sitting out means a loss. But San Antonio, Toronto and others lost nothing by refusing to offer incentives. Not every city will have the same nerve, which is the value of the compact. It makes the safer bet the default rather than the exception.

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